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Abstract:  The principle of evolutionary continuity states that all animal capacities and behaviors 
exist — with variations in degree — in continuity with other species. Rather than assuming 
discontinuity, we should ask why any behavior observed in humans would not be found in at 
least some other sentient animals under similar conditions. In the case of suicide, the more 
pertinent issue might be the ethical one: our human responsibility for creating conditions under 
which other animals might deliberately seek to end their own lives. 
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Peña-Guzmán (2017) asks whether animals are capable of suicide, citing established 
philosophical notions of forethought and intention in the definition of suicide. The idea is that 
one must form the intention intellectually and then choose freely and deliberately to bring 
about one’s own death. This rational capacity and moral freedom are presumed to set humans 
apart from other animals, but I contend that such a definition describes neither the human nor 
any other animal’s motivations for self-destructive behavior.  
The assumptions of human exceptionalism are wrong on at least three counts. The first 
error is the notion that humans are distinct from all the other animals when we are in fact 
biologically and psychologically continuous with other animals. The second error is the notion 
that we are superior to all the other animals, a concept that has no biological meaning outside a 
false comparison across adaptive behaviors and ecological niches. The third error is the highly 
questionable belief that human behavior is motivated by reason and free moral choice. 
Assuming evolutionary continuity between humans and other animals resolves these errors and 
gives more accurate direction to our study of both ourselves and other animals (Griffin 1976). 
Biologically, humans are not distinct from all the other animals apart from the taxonomic 
definition the species itself; we are in various ways and to varying degrees continuous with 
them on the evolutionary tree of life. Cumulative scientific evidence indicates that there is no 
empirical justification for human exceptionalism (Benvenuti 2016). 
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The classical form of human exceptionalism is scientifically indefensible not least in that 
it fails to describe humans accurately. Human cognition is far more implicit (i.e., less conscious) 
than the philosophers of rationality and moral freedom assumed. Cacioppo and Decety (2009) 
describe a contemporary understanding of human unconsciousness: “It is now widely 
recognized that cognitive, affective, and behavioral processes often unfold unconsciously and 
that this unconscious processing frees up limited processing resources.” Affect is also central 
and inseparable from human cognition; affective assessment is necessary to behavioral 
decisions (Damasio 1995). Even the “self” is an ongoing cognitive construction to account for the 
experiences of living (Damasio 2010). Developmental and social neuroscience have shown that 
the idea of a free and rational human underestimates the extent to which our sense of self is 
inhabited by our sense of others (Schore 2001, Cacioppo and Patrick 2008, Ravven 2013).  
With regard to nonhuman animals, study after study has reported not only physical but 
psychological continuity, including tool making and use, reasoning and problem solving, 
cooperative and competitive social relations, communication, bonding, love, fear, rage, 
friendship, and grief. Penn (2011) has noted: “Hardly an issue of Current Biology or Animal 
Cognition goes by without some effigy of human cognitive uniqueness being torn down and 
dragged through the mud . . . from tool use to metacognition, from deception to death, much of 
comparative psychology over the past 35 years has been driven by the single-minded goal of 
demonstrating that nonhuman animals are capable of human-like cognition.” Penn contends 
that it is the preferential treatment and assumptions about human cognition that are especially 
problematic. 
Mammalian neuroscientist Jaak Panksepp (2012) makes a similar point about affective 
and motivational continuity between humans and other animals: “Why the weight of scientific 
evidence remains to be accepted by most neuroscientists is a cultural-historical issue, not a 
scientific one. By sharing a neural platform for diverse affective experiences, the core SELF can 
be considered to be a ‘nomothetic’ (universal) brain function.” Psychopathologies like 
depression and post-traumatic stress disorder have been found in nonhuman animals 
(Bradshaw et al. 2005). The Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness concludes that a 
preponderance of evidence supports continuity of consciousness between humans and other 
animals (Low 2012). Humanism and human exceptionalism, remnants of philosophy before the 
age of science, were embedded unquestioningly in much early science. But science is capable of 
self-correction. The more concise question regarding suicide might be why would we would not 
expect to find it in other animals. 
In her book on animal grief, King (2013, 2016) relates a heart-breaking anecdote about a 
mother bear and her cub at the end of their lives on a bear farm in China. These farmed bears 
are kept horizontal in coffin-like cages for their entire lives, with a metal catheter inserted into 
their abdomens to harvest bile. They are allowed one unrestrained arm with which to feed 
themselves. It is a life so horrible that reports say the bears sometimes simply go mad and beat 
their heads against the bars of their cages until they die. On one mother bear, King (2013) 
reports: “The cub cried out in distress as a worker prepared to harvest his bile. The mother, 
distressed by her loved infant’s pain, broke free and squeezed the life out of her baby so that he 
would no longer suffer. Overcome by her own emotional pain, she ran, purposefully, headfirst 
into a wall, killing herself” (p. 117).  
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How are we to evaluate this reported event? Is it more objective to assume that this was 
merely an instance of blind affect, induced reflexively by stress and pain inflicted on a species 
that is intellectually and emotionally incapable of mercy-murder-suicide? The same types of 
immediate affective assessment may well be operative in an ursine and human mother under 
similar conditions. The role of affect in human behavior is at least as powerful as that of any 
potential for rational analysis or moral freedom. Hence the more urgent question may concern 
the ethics of subjecting any animal, human or nonhuman, to such levels of negative affect that 
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